After a five days' occupancy, on April 16th the army left Forsyth and continued the retrograde movement northeastward. Headquarters ofthe Commanding General moved up the valley of Swan Creek, passing through the deserted vü-We of Taney City, and after a ten miles' march camped on Billoue Creek. Here Curtis remained three days, awaiting, amid almost constant rain, the progress of his troops. Snpplies had been brought dhect from Springfield to Forsytb, but notwithstanding the most enei-getie efibrts, the amount received was very small. The great distance of the army from Eolia, its constantly shifting position, the inadeqnate and worn out couditiou of the traius, the great scarcity of animals, the almost impassable uature of the nigged and primitive mouutaiuous roads, the swollen condition of the deep and rapid streams, aggravated by almost constant rains, the deep mud encountered in the allu\'ial valleys, rendered the transportation of supplies eufScient tor the nse of the army almost an impossibihty. But httle forage or subsists ence could be obtained in tbe primitive and thinly settled conntry traversed by the army. On the march, the country was Ècoured for a distance of from twenty to fifty miles in either direction for forage and grain. All the mills within twenty miles of tbe line of march were kept constantly at work in the prodnetion of fiour and cornmeal. Forage waa remarkably scarce. The soldiers were suffering for shoes and clothing. Cavalry and artillei'y horses were mnch needed; horse-shoes were also in great demand. The scarcity of suhsistcnco often rendered the rations of men and animals very light, but the army pressed onward.
The ditiiculties of the march were very great, but from April 16th, when they left Forsyth, until May 2d, when their advance reached Batesville, Arkansas, a distance, by the route traveled, of 165 miles, tbe troops moved with the utmost possible i-apidity. From Fnrsytb the ronte lay np the valley of Swan Ci'eek, throngh Taney Citj, thence northeasterly, crossing the sti'eanis of Little Beaver and Biff Beavei\ throngh Amo, ci-ossing Cowskin Creek and Hnnter's Fork to Yera Cruz, county seat of Douglass County, Missouri, on Bryant's Fiirk, a distance of forty-nine miles. From Yera Cruz the route Continued easterly, crossing Bryant's Fork and Big NoJ'th Fork to West Plains, comity seat of Ilowell County, Missouri, a distance of forty-three miles. From West Plains the route turned almost directly south, crossing Spring River to Salem, Arkansas, a distance of thirty-two miles. From Salem it continned in the same direction, crossing Strawberry River and Polk Bayou, tbrougb Polk Bayoa P. C. to Batesville, Arkansas, a distance of forty-one miles.
On April lOtli Curtis left Billoue Creek, and after a four days' march arrived at Yera Cruz on the afternoon of the 22d. Yera Craz consisted of three or four log houses and a miU, situated in a deep valley, on Bryant's Fork. It was entirely snrrounded by the bigb hills of the Czark. At night the evergreen forests on these hills were inflamed. A magnificent spectacle presented itself to the view. The camp appeared encircled by a vast ampbitheatre of burning forests, riigh up on the hills tbe fiâmes and smoke swept arouud and above tbe dark forms of the trees, and lit up the skies with a •wild and lnminouB brilliance.
, The country traversed waa of tbe same wild, pi-imitive, [ moimtainous character. A few more iuhahitants than had hitherto been met were found ou the line of mardi. The laiiii were almost incessant. The roads were in a terrible cüüditiun. Some of tbe troops were nearly out of provisions, but at Arno a train arrived wbicb supplied the most pressing ' wants. The divisions marched hy different roads, at a considerable distance apart. Tbe rains and swollen mountainons streams rendered tlie marcb very slow and difficult. The troops were much delayed. Tliey were hurried forward with as much speed as eonkl be obtained over the narrow, steep and stony roads of tbe Ozark. On April 25tb Curtis left Vera Cruz, and, after two days' rapid inarch, arrived at West Plains on the 27th. He was rapidly folkiweil by the entire armv. Tîie country traversed was stiil the wild, broken region of the Ozark-high hills covered with forests of evergreen and scrnb oak-until witbin about ten miles of West Plains, when it became more level and allnvial. Tbe Ozark Mountains were now at length crossed. Tbe entire campaign since lea^"ing Rolla bad tbus far heeu conducted in tbe mountainous, billy i-egioii of Missouri and northwestern Arkansas. The soldiers were now to bid tarewell to the rocks and evergreens, the deep, cold Btreams, rougb roads and pure air of the Ozark. They were nest to traverse tbe swamps, cane brakes and cotton fields, the primeval foresta and alluvial bottom lands of White River and Arkansas.
On arriving at West Plains, Curtis earnestly requested that additioua! supplies, teams, eavalry horses, tools, clothing and equipments of all kinds be forwarded to replace tbe machinery of the army worn out in the weary and laborious iiiareh over the Ozark. Tbe Kne of snpplies was at once establisbed from Eolia, via Houston, to West Plains. All the mills for many miles, within reach of the army, were still kept constantly at work in tbe production of meal and flour.
Dispatches were received at West Plains from Halleck, at Pittsburg Landing. He directed a rapid onward movement to the Mississippi, Van Dorn was already at Corinth, and Price waB about to land at Memphis, Tbe enemy, he said, moved r fiye miles to one advanced by tbe Army of the Soutb-WeBt, 'P News was also received from other sources of the embarkation ^f of Price's army at Des Arc, on Wbite liiver, for Memphis. ' *' Tbe rebel army, in moving eastward from Van Biu-en, after ^' the battle of Pea Eidge, bad advanced mainly by steamboatB '' on the Arkansas River to Little Rock, thence over the rail--' road to DuvalFs Bliifi' and Des Arc, on Wbite River, and thence down White River and up the Mississippi by steamboats to Memphis. The Army of the Sonth-West had performed a wearisome and difficult march of one huudred and seventy-five miles, from Pea Ridge to West Plains, over the • rough aud almost impassable roads of the Ozark, tJnder euch circumstances, it was not wonderful tbat tbe rebel army, traveling by steamboats and raib-oads, could move five miles to one obtained by tbe Army of the South-West, nio\ing on ' foot over the moujitains, with a worn out and iusuificient wagon train. Buttering for supplies and clothing, and compelled to scour for miles an almost nninhabited eoiintry for forage and subsistence.
Orders were also here received from the Secretary of War, directing that Captain A. W. Eilet, of the 59th iilinois Infantry, be permitted to select not exceeding six snbaltem officers and a squad of not more than fifty men, all to be volunteers from his regiment. With these he was to proceed by the most direet route to 8t. Louis, and tbence on " an important aud dangerous expedition down the Mississippi," The order was obeyed, and Captain EUet selected his men and started to St. Louis. Tbis was the origin of the Mississippi Marine Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General A, W. EUet, An army numbering about 6,000 men had been pushed forward from Pilot Knob, Missouri, the terminus of the Iron Mountain railroad, from St. Louis, and was at Pocahontas, on Black River, in Arkansas, under command of Brigadier General Frederick Steele. Ilaileck had originally ordered this force to advance on Helena, Arkansas, Steele's force was now placed under command of Curtis. It was an abject to form a junction witb tbis Jbrce as soon as practicable.
The guerrilla chief, Coleinau, was reported to be at Batesville, seveuty-three miles south, in Arkani?as, with a force of four hundred rebels. He was daily receiving reinforcements, -and it was determined, if possible, to capture his entii-e gaug.
On April 29th, leaving most of the ti-oops and his own headquarters and most of bis staff at West Plaiue, with inBtrnctions to follow as rapidly as possible, Curtis advanced rapidly to the south, taking with bim the 1st brigade of Osterhaiis' division, consisting of infantry and Weltiey's battery, and also detachmente from the 3d Iowa and 3d Illinois cavalry regiments and Bowen's battalion, being all the cavalry force available.
On April 30tb he caînped at Saleni. The remainder of the army followed witb as mucb rapidity as could be obtained. As the troops moved soutb and lett the elevated and colder regions of the Ozark, they found Spring far advanced. Tbe woods were in full leaf, the nir was mild and pleasant, and sometimes imcomfortably wami. At Batesville roses were in inll bloom. The country traversed was rolling and billy, well wooded, and well adapted to cultivation.
Curtis, with bis advance guard, left Salem at noon on May 1st, and camped after a march of about fourteen miles. On tke 2d he advanced to Polk Bayou, distant about sixteen miles from Batesville, and rested until evening. About ten o'clock P. M. the march was resumed, iu the liope of capturing Coleman. The night was dark. Seventeen times tbe road crossed Polk Bayou, and the stream continually became deeper as it neared White Kiver. Tbe road was rough, and the frequent crossing of the creek rendered the advance slow and difficult. At five o'clock on the morning of the 3d, the troops reached Batesville and surrounded the town. The upper and lower ferrie.^, the former at tbe town and the latter a mile below, were seized. It was Ibund that Coleman was encamped in the woods on tbe south side of the river, out of range of our shells. His force was increased to about 12Ö0 men. The Union troops occupied Batesville, but were not able to cross and attack the enemy, as there were but two or three small fiatboats available, A skirmishing fire was car--ried on aci-oss the river, at the lower ferry. The rebels gathered on the opposite shore. Under cover of the trees they would crawl up lo the bank and fire across at tbe Union soldiers, at tbe same time using a great deal of profane language towards the "Yanks" and abolitionists. A Union Lieutenant was struck by a spent ball. A few rounds of shell from Bowen's mountain howitzers dispersed the rebels wounding several aud killing three. Among the killed was Lieut. Col. Douglas McBride, a son of the rebel General MeBi'ide. His bod}' was left unburied by the rebels, who precijiitiitety retreated from the vicinity. Several days afterward he was buried by a detail of Union soidiers.
Batesville was a beantiful place, situated one hundred and ninety miles south of EoUa. It bad thus far escaped the ravages of war, and had luucli the appearance of a noi'thoru town. It had been a prominent business point. The streeta were wide, and were liued by many elegant l-estdenees, surrounded by groves, flowers aud sbrubbeiy. After the lrmg and weai'isciiiiii march through the mountains, the anny had suddeidy fonnd a garden in the wilderness. It was the couuty seat of Independence County, and contained at the commencement of the war a population of about 2,000 souls. Out of a voting population of 3,200, the county gave 1,100 Totes for Union delegates to the convention which seceded Arkansas from the Union. When capturer!, the sentiment of Batesville was divided, but principally of a rebel cast. The women were especially bitter. The sour looks of the rebel maidens were at first disheartening to the galhiutry of the soldiers. They, however, eventually became more amiable and agreeable. Several prominent rebels were captured in the town. At the post-office, a heavy mail, with the latest Little Rock and M(im]>his papers, and at the court-house, some hundred stand of arms, aa well as a considerable amount of contrabaud properly, were also seized.
Tbe !-ejiiaiiidcr of the iiriuy rapidly approached Batesville, and camped iu its vicinity, and as far east as Sulphur Rock, THE AHMT OF THE SOUTH-WEST.
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[es distant, on the Jacksonport roîid. A cavalry force once sent east along the nortl.-irn bank of White Jacksonport, situated at the junction of White and .ivers, twenty-six miles from Ba'esville. This force in Jacksonport on the morniug of May 4th, and the t«wn already occupied by a portion of General command. The remainder of Steele's army rapidly il lit Jîickî^onport. and Stcele reported, for orders, and i"th. position and condition of his command, to Rope ferries were immediately put in operation at ille, and new and more conimodions boats were conarrival of the Union army at Batesville was marked iwery and lengthy proclamation from the rebel Govnr. dated May 5th. It recited that the enemy lavimiM-' the northeastern part of the State, while Ar-•^as troops were ealled to the defense of other portions of Confenlcracy ; portrayed the beauties of democratic libState sovereignty, secession, etc., contrasted with the ism of Lincoln and his hirelings ; called for 4,500 men as home guards lUitil the Confederacy would protect State, and especially urged -'gentlemen of leisure and to go and tight, leaving the tillers of the soil to aoniething for subsistence. Au expedition was sent out which destroyed extensive re wurks of the rebels, about fourteen miles northwest Batesvjlle. Large numbers of citizens came into Batese to take the oath of allegiance. It was apparent that a V considerable Union sentiment existed througlK)ut the ntry, and only needed encouragement and protection to everywhere conspicuous. A newspaper, "The IndeBalance," which had formerly existed in Batesville, Lg, variously, as they were the more populai*. Union •ebel doctrines, was revived and set in operation by the power. It was edited by Sergt. Maj. Tiiikham, of Iowa cavalry, and served as a medinm for dissemUnion doctrines and tho latest news to the troops and to the people, and for the publishing of general orders tsf. other military information. The 1st division aud the 4th, 5th and a detachment •^'' 6th cavalry Missouri volunteers, under Osterbaus, White River and pushed forward to Little Red the \ncinity of the town of Searcey, in "White County, forty miles south of Batesville, on the direct road to and dii-\ tant ahout forty-nine miles from Little Rock. Recotuioi?. sanees were thrown forward into the town of Seareey.
A cavalry expedition, under Lieut. Col. Wood, of thi lit Indiana cavalry, was also sent out hy Steele, from Jaik-ü-port, and penetrated as far as Augusta, on the east bank of Wliite River. This expedition had two unimportant 8kim ishes with the enemy. lialleek had intended to liave the army of Curtis pâ s rapidly as possihie to 6ome point on the Mississippi, wlim it jFOuld be of assistance in the capture of Memphis iiml in the opening of the Mississippi, and where it wonid he mon accessible for supplies by water communication. It wii« also designed to capture Little Rock, and for this purpose l)^ter-haue had advanced to Little Red River.
At this period the MÍ8.siseippi waa flooded, and tho h\\. awampy country east of Jaeksonport was converted into a vast lake. Scouts sent eastward were unable to progress more than a few miles beyond Jaeksonport. The coimtir was perfectly impassable. Our gunboats were at the time besieging Fort Pillow, and it was even thought that the mm of the cannonading was heard near Jaeksonport. The Army of the South-We.st was thus prevented by a flood from pro. greasing eastward and assisting in any attempt to CÄptnre Memphis.
The army not being able to move eastward, Curtis intended to advance as rapidly as jmssible, via Searcey. and capture Little Rock. In addition to the line of coinmimica* tion with Rolla, an additional line was opened witli Pilot Knob, and supplies woi-e rceeivod o\er both routes. (íar-risoued postß were establishud aud maiutuiiied ou the liülia line at Houston and West Plains, Missouri, and at Salem, Arkansas ; and also on the Pilot Knob route at Smithville, Pocahontas and Pittman's Ferry, Arkansas, and at Reevea' Station, Pattersonville and Greenville, Kissouri. Matters were thus being rapidly arranged for the captnre of tbe rebel State capital.
But at this juncture a telegraphic order, dated May 6th, was received by Curtis on May 9th, through department headquarters at St. Lmiis, from Halleok, at Pittsburg Landing. Curtis was to send, "as rapidly as possible," a portion of the infantry of the anny to Halleck, at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, either via Rolla, Pilot Knob or the Mississippi, Their services were needed in the great concentration of national troops whicb occurred in front of Beauregard'a position at Corinth, The order fnrtber said that Curtis "must operate in Arkansas mostly with cavalry and artillery. Tan Dorn and Price are both here " (at Corinth), "Curtis' infantry must make forced marches, so as to reinforce us as soon as possible."
In obedience to tbis order, tbe 36th and Mth Illinois, 2d aud 15th Missouri infantry volunteers, and Company C, Benton Hussars, were placed nnder command of Brig. Gen. Aeboth, and called the 2d division. The 25th, 35tli and 59th IUinois and 22d Indiana infantry volunteers and Company F, 1st Missouri cavalry volunteers, Capt, Clifford, were placed under command of Brig. General Jeff. C. Davis, and called the 3d division. In accordance with orders, Steele alao detached two regiments from his command, the 21st and 38tli Illinois infantry volunteers, under Colonel Carlin. AU these troops were ordered to proceed by tbe most direct route, and as rapidly as possible, to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, there to await fm-tber orders.
Iu parting with officers and troops who had so long and so faithfully served under him, sharing alike the long and weary marches and the dangers of battle, the feelings of the commanding Gíeneral were expressed in the following farewell order :
•¿ Asboth and Davis both expressed their regrets at parting with one who bad for so long a time been tbeir commander, and promised that their troops would maintain, iu Tennefieee, tbe glory already won during the campaign and at Pea Eidge, and that the honor of the Army of the South-Weet ßhould remain, by them, forever nntarnisbed.
The departure of these troops broke up tbe original organization of the Army of the South-Weat. The sudden withdrawal of BO lai-ge a force, temporarily deranged all plans, and delayed the capture of Little Eock. A portion of Osterbaus' command had beeu withdrawn and departed for Cape Girardeau, but he still held his position at Little Red Kver. Steele had hitherto been camped at and in the vicinity of Jacksonport. He was now ordered to Batesville, and on ilay 15th left Jacksonport witb the greater portion of hie command. Only a small force of cavalry was left in that vicinity, on tbe west bank of Black Eiver.
The troops remaining were at onee reorganized in three divisions. The following statement will show the disposition of the forces under the new organization, and dming the. remainder of the campaign lmtil the army arrived at Hele The telegraph line wae extended south from Pilot Enob and over the Pilot Knob route to the headquarterM of Curtis, at Batesville. It was continued from Eatesville eaatwai'd to a point in the woods about ten miles distant from Jacksoiiport, but it was not completed to these points until a short time before tbe evacuation of Batesville, about the last of June.
On May 12th, Halleck sent the following telegram to Cui' -tifl, whicb was forwarded from tbe end of the line and received by the latter on May 15th : On reaching Little Ropk, you will aasuuie Ibe direction of affaira in Arkansas HS Military Governoi', All civil anlliDrilies wlio are iiiitrustworthy, or who n-ill not take the oath of allegiance, will be removed from office and others Hp|iointfd in thoir piac-e, TLo telegraph will follow you aa rapidly aa possible.
H, W, SALLECK, Major Gonacal, Although the army under General Curtis never arrived at Little Rock, tbe duties of Military Governor were by him performed, in the oi-ganization of the lut regiment of Arkansas Infantry volnnteers, and in other ways, until his arrival at Helena, when John S. Pbelps, of Missouri, was appointed Military Governor oJ' the State, by the President.
Ou May lSth, by order of Halleck, the command of southwestern Missouri, aud the line úf posts from Rolla to Cassrille, was relinquished to Brigadier General Eg-bevt E. Brown, of the Missouri State Militia. The army of Curtis was thus left in a comparatively nuencumliered situation to continue ¡te operations iu Arkansas, having only to sustain a portion of ttc garrison posts on its lines of comniuiiication in the rear.
The removal of the greater portion of the intantry from the snnj^, although perhaps necessary to Halleck at Corinth, toKtiier with au order fi'om the quartermaster department at St. Louis, which temporarily stopped all trains going to Curtís, delayed and ultimately pre\'euted an advance on Little Bock hy the Army of the South-West. Curtis appealed in strong terms to Halleck for reinforcements. His pickets and outposts were constantly assailed in the front and on the iiüks by an ever-vigilant enemy, aud the country iu his rear awarmed with guerrillas and partisan bands, remlering large escorts necessary to every train, and endangei-ing the weak garrisoned poste on his extended lines of communication. Ee was in the heart of an enemy's country. Troops temporarily left on post, garrison and other duties in southwestern MiäänTiri, had beeu taken from his command by the order placing General Brown in commaud at Springfield. The departure of most of bis infantry left tbe army too weak to MOYe forward, but it was not until after the 5th of June, wiien the army had fallen back from Little Red River to Batesviüe, that a letter was received from Brigadier General Scoffield, commanding the "District of tbe State of Missouri," who, by order of Halleck, placed under the commaud of Cnrtie all the troops in southern Missouri, including the pecuhar organization known ae the " Missouri State Militia," who were regularly enlisted into the United States military serrice, but retained, to a certain extent, under tbe control of the (Governor of their State, upon condition that tbey were not to leave it except in its defense. This order did not, however, very materially increase tbe strength of tlie army, . beyond enabling troops that bad been detacbed from their divisions on poet duty to rejoin their commands. The A portion of the regiment under Col. Rombauer was afterwards induced to march with the army to Holiiiii. The remainder was left in Miesoiiri, and the lack of patiuutioipiiit displayed by the regiment in reftising to march to the euocor of its fellow soldiers in the front, was censured alike IIT Cnrtis and Scoffield. General AVasliburn's conmiand, the 13tb Illinois cavalry, and the 5th Kansas cavalry, were also Mabled to join the army of Curtis. These events, and the reorganization of the army, and chanf;;es in the hnes of •"•' •• ration, caused a delay, which, joined to other circuinsh... . proved fatal to the forward movement on Little liock. Whetlierj at the time, it would have been possible to iii;\in-tain conjiiumication overland between Little Rock and l'h-> Knob and Rolla, with the force then composing the army, Í6 problematical. It wja the opinion of Ilaileck that it K'"-U not be done, but Curtis tlionglit otherwise, and was anxinus to make the attempt.
An advance had been attempted via Searcey. A severe conflict occm-red near " Searcey Landing," Little Red River, on May 19th, between the enemy and a foraging party t' roin Osterhaus' division, composed of detachments of infantry and cavalry, numbering about two hundred, under command of Major Kielmansegge, of the 4th Missouri cavalry, subseiiuently reinforced by Colonel Waring and the 17th Missouri infantry, under Colonel Hassendenbel and Lieutenant Colonel Cramer. The Union troops were attacked by about eight hundred Texan rangers, and a portion of the infantry, after i proper resistance, ofíered to surrender; but the rebels continued firing on them, refusing to accept them as ])ripoiií!rs, and barbaronsly maltreating and murdering all who fell into their hands, aud destroying ambulances sent to pick up \h wounded. Being thus compelled to fight, the Union troops again attacked the enemy. The noise of the firing stMO litought the Union reinforcements, when tbe rebels retired from the field. The Union loss was sevi^iiteen killed, tbirtywounded and two missiag. The ri'l)ei advance was reported to have been commanded by Geii^'i-al Eust and subsequently hy General ilindnian. Tbeii' entire loss was mkmiwD. Eighteen of their dead were left upon tbe field.
As soou as the troops of Steele's division were drawn in from Jacksouport, on the remote left fiank, to Batesville, on Ite dh-ect liue to Little Eoek, aud the army reorganized and j the liues of communication witb Eolta and Pilot Knob [arranged, with a view to the better securing of supplies, the Isdvauce on the capital of Arkansas was attempted.
On ilay 19th, leaving Steele in command at Batesville, Curtis crossed White Eiver and moved to Searcey with as mueli rapidit)' as was possible in a teri-ible rain-storm lasting Úiirty-six hours, wliicb rendered the roads almost impassable. .Heremained at the front until summoned back to Batesville I to attend to pressing duties.
At Searcey and on Little Eed River were the divisions of Cwr and Osterhaus. Little Eed River had been bridged by Ihe Union troops, and it was hoped tbat tbe army could soon ' move forward. But the muddy roads were rendered entirely I impassable for a large force by the extremely severe vaius • occurring at this time. Little Red River, and other streams, ewoOeü by tbe rains, could not be crossed by tbe army. The continual interruption of supply trains by guerrillas in ilis-!ouri, and tlie order from the quartermaster department at St. Louis, stopping these trains, deranged plans and prevented movement. Forage became entirely insufiicient, and it was the opinion of Generals Steele, Carr and Osterhaus, in a consnltatiou at Little Eed River, whither, after the return of Curtis to Batesville, Steelc! had gone for that purpose, tbat tbe position on Little Eed Eiver must be abandoned. Skirmislies were of almost daily occm-rence. Tbe enemy was rallying iu force, and with his newly recruited coD.=cripts, was above tbe Union position, on Little Eed River, endangerhig our right flank. " For God's sake," wrote Winslow, üie chief Quartermaster of tbe army, to Curtie, " consider the lfi ANS ALS OF IOWA.
[JANÜABT, practicability of getting trains over the road you are gg to take !" Oarr, in particular, ui'ged many reasons for tte return of tho ai-my to Batesville, in good order, before it was ' attacküd in ite exposed position and overwhelmed by num-• hers. The iinpra«ticability of a further advance via Settreej becanie evident. Within forty-niue miles oí Little Ruck, the "' army had halted iu its ouward mai-ch. About the 5th of June it retraced its steps to the vicinity of Batesville ; Canremaining for a brief time in camp a few miles south of White Eiver. It is to be regretted that the occupation of the State capital was thtia prevented by bad roads, inadequate force and the ditificulty of traiieportiug supplies. Rector, the rebel Governor, hatl ordered out 4,400 militia to oppose au ad-" vanee, and the proclam.atiou forbade troops leaving the State, which it was necessary for them to defend. There was, at ., the time, at or uoar Little Bock, a small force of about tw and a half regiments of Texan raugers aud the rebel guitbot " Keutticky." There were rumors of other troops, and th eueuiy was i-apidly reinforced, btit the place was very feebl protected. Tiie gunboat, driven out of the Mississippi aft« the naval victory at Meinpiiis, had sought refuge in the Ai kausas River, and on its arrival at Little Roek had shelle the camp of the Texan rangers, supposing them to be TJuiö troops. This reveals the reign of terror which existed amon the enemy. The order of Rector calling out the mihtia ml with a chilly reception by the people. Cousiderable TJuio sentiment e.xisteil, although everywhere, exeept within th Union lines, held in eheck and overawed by superior reb( power. Union men promised supplies of forage on the Iii of mareh. Prominent rebel citizens fled before the antic pated advance. Rector himself left Little Rock, and th State archives were removed from the city for safe keeping Had it beeu possible to occupy the State capital and regularl inaugurate a provisional State government, comparative ordf and qtiiet might have beeu restored to Arkansas at a mut earlier date tliau the time they were subsequently establisha Once more rebellion wae protected, not so much by its ow; strength and valor, as by the ditHcnlty of penetrating its vast ten'itorj. A few roving bands of guerrillas and partisan eavalry, aided by a small regular force of rebels in the front, and by roads almost absolutely impassable, were enabled to dieck the movements of an ai-my, by hovering on its rear, cutting off its supplies and harrassing the feebler garrison posts on its lines of communication.
About the 2dof June a pontoon train was received, the • firet that had ever been with the Ai-my of the Sonth-West.
At Rolla, in Jannary, Cm-tig had applied to Halleck to send a pontoon train to the army, then about to advance over deep and flooded streams to attack Price. The reply was, that the only one available was needed elsewhere and could not be -spared. The bridge received at Batesville was not of snffiáent length to cross White River, but it was subsequently Èrown across Black Eiver at Jacksonport, It was placed in liai'ge of Captain Van Sant, of the 2ith Miesom-i infantry, -and did good service among the swamps and bayous encoun-' itÈred between Jacksonport and Helena.
A cavalry re con no Usance under Lieut. Col. Sickles, of the 9fli minois cavalry, was sent hj Col. Brackett from Jackson-" port, on May 26th, to Augusta, Cache River, and Cotton Plant. The object was to ascertain the position and condition of the enemy, and to capture the telegrams in the " offi ce of the Memphis and Little Rock telegraph line at Cot" .ton Plant, The operator bad, however, taken the alarm and " Jed, 2nd all important docnment were removed. In a skir-• "mieli \rith the enemy, on May 28th, at Cache River bridge, Col. Sickles had two men wounded. The rebel loss was four tilled, fom-wounded and one taken prisoner. Col. Sickles ' -' "tetamed \pith his command to Jacksonport on May 29th. " On May 2Tth a Union force under Lieutenant Colonel • lewis, of the 1st Missouri cavah-y, attacked a i-ebcl force at "Jeffrie' s Mills," on the south side of White River, and a öomber of miles west of Searcey. The rebels were defeated fitli a loss III' four killed and about twenty wounded. The se was two wounded. 3
On May 29tb, an expedition under command of Major Bowen, consisting of a detacbnient of tbe 3d Iowa cavalry, under Major Drake, and Bowen's battalion, had a severe skinnisb with the enemy fifty-five miles west of Batesville. Tbe engagement was variously styled "Richwoods," "Kickapoo Bottom," and " Sillamore." Tbe Union loss was oue killed, and Capt. Israel Anderson, of the 3d Iowa, and one other wounded. The rebels lost three killed and twenty-two taken prisoners. Major Bowen captured thii-ty-four rifles aad sbot-guns, about forty bowie knives, several swords and pistols, and thirty horses, witb which be returned to Batesville.
Skirmishes by tbe outposts and scouting parties were in fact of almost daily occurrence, both at Batesville and during the remainder of tbe marcb to Helena. Many occurred of whicb no reliable oiHcial reports were ever given. It is impossible to present accounts of any save tbe more important of tbese engagements. In no instance were tbe Union forces defeated, and generally the rebels were dispersed with little difficulty. But they continually hovered upon the flanks, rear and front of the army, lying in wait for foraging partieB, stragglers, and small detachments.
While the army remained at Batesville, and dnring its march tbrongh Arkansas, it was evident that very mauy of the citizens of Arkansas were still loyal to tbe Constitution i and the old Union. They bad been juggled out of the Union i by the tricks of a convention wbich tbey bad elected to oppose secession. Hitherto their State bad escaped the devas-1 tation of war. The most bitter i-ebele bad generally found their way into the rebel army. The Union citizens, unable to escape, had remained at home. Tbe rebel law of conscription had not then been put in force, and these men had escaped the rebel army. Under the protection of the Union arms, hundreds voluntarily came forward and took the oath of allegiance. No compulsion was used, and the nature aud obligations of the oath were fully explained to tbem before itB administration. Tbe fact tbat no government vouchers for forage or other property received by the union army, were ever paid until the applicant had established his loyalty bytaking the oath, probably inflneneed many rebels to perjure tliemselves to their government. This fact became ai'terwards evident wben n^any of tbese men were captured figbting as soldiers in the rebel army. Their invariable excuse under 6nch circumstances was that the departnre of tbe Uniiiu army from their vicinity compelled them to enter the rebel ranks. But it is also true that many took the oath with no other view tiaL to attest their loyalty to their goverument. These were generally the poorer and illiterate classes of the people, small farmers and others, tbe so styled "poor white trash "of the South,but the yeomanry of Arkansas. They had no snpplies for the army tor whieh to receive vouchers, and most frequently lived at distant and exposed points where loyalty to the Union was certain to be visited witb outrage and persecution. Tbe rich and leading men of the community generally held aloof. Their sympathies were with the slaveholding aristocracy of fhe South. Some even of these, desired also to take the oath, but as they were generally regarded with more or less suspicion, they were often required to give bond in large sums for its faithful observance. As the civil law did not recognize these military bonds, the method subsequently adopted wbere tliey were violated was to try the offender by "Military Commissions," courts resembling " Courts Martial," but assuming a jurisdiction over civilians, guerrillas, and others not exercised by the latter. In cases of conviction a fine either less or equal to the amount of the bond was collected by tbe military power.
The guerrillas and partizan bands of the enemy did all in their power to injure the Union, cause. The rebels were unable to cope with the national army hi the open field, but they sought in every way to harass it and cut off its supplies. lieBride with a force of rebel guerrillas was active iu the vicinity of Tellville. In Missouri, tbe operatious of Colemaii's band and otber guerrilla forces, numbering abont four hundred men, near Houston and West Plains, were directed 30, AMNALS OF IOWA. against the lines of communication with the army. Several valuable supply trains were captured en route. Over forty wagons were burned and tbe supplies appropriated by the guerrillas. Lieut. Col, Samuel N. Wood, of the 6tli Missouri cavalry, was very active, in the pursuit of Coleman, gi^^ng bim no rest, but he eluded captm-e or an open fight.
The system of "partizan warfare " had been adopted hy tbe rebel government as a part of its policy. However justifiable in tbeory or from former experience in otber lauds, in the United States during the rebellion, it pro\'ed a system of lawless maraudiug, liceutious rapiue and brutal murder. Yet nevertheless, tbe rebel Generals in Arkansas now recognized the services of such men as McBHde, Schuable, a renegade methodist clergyman, Coleman aud other guerrilla chiefs, and Gen. Hindman, in a published order, devised a plan of guerrilla operations and directed tbe details of the system. The Union armies had ever eschewed guerrilla warfare. Curtis, in a general order, denounced the operations of Coleman and deplored tbeir efi'ect, not upon the army, which could not thereby be materially injured, but upon the innocent and defenceless inhabitants of the country. The rebel Generala, filled with impotent rage, by a flag of truce, sent letters to Curtis, in which they avowed their system and threatened a war of extermination if these guerrillas when captured were not ti-eated as prisoners of war. General Hindman claimed to have received information that the rebel prisoners captured by Bowen at " Sillamore " were to be hanged, and that Curtie had declared a war of extermination. Gen. Eoane had received equally reliable information tbat the national authorities were compelling the uuliappy Confederate citizens of the country to take an oath of allegiance to the federal government-an oatb, wliich as he protested, could not be respected by the Confederate authorities.
